Similar Search Results

On efficient and procedurally-fair equilibrium allocations in sharing games

Yoshihara, Naoki - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001537632

Rationality and solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems : rationalizability and Nash solutions

Xu, Yongsheng; Yoshihara, Naoki - In: Mathematical social sciences 66 (2013) 1, pp. 66-70

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751745

Extended social ordering functions for rationalizing fair allocation rules as game forms in the sense of Rawls and Sen

Gotoh, Reiko; Suzumura, Kōtarō; Yoshihara, Naoki - In: International journal of economic theory 1 (2005) 1, pp. 21-41

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003150021

A new insight into three bargaining solutions in convex problems

Xu, Yongsheng (contributor); Yoshihara, Naoki (contributor) - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002548437

Nonconvex bargaining problems

Xu, Yongsheng (contributor); Yoshihara, Naoki (contributor) - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002548458

Extended social ordering functions for rationalizing fair game forms à la Rawls and Sen

Gotoh, Reiko (contributor); Suzumura, Kōtarō (contributor) - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002548478

A class of fair distribution rules à la Rawls and Sen

Gotoh, Reiko; Yoshihara, Naoki - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 22 (2003) 1, pp. 63-88

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001770436

Nonconvex bargaining problems : some recent developments

Xu, Yongsheng; Yoshihara, Naoki - 2020

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013273823

Partially-honest Nash implementation : a full characterization

Lombardi, Michele; Yoshihara, Naoki - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 70 (2020) 3, pp. 871-904

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012387785

Partially-honest Nash implementation : a full characterization

Lombardi, Michele; Yoshihara, Naoki - 2017

A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, "Do not lie if you do not have to" to serve your material interest. By assuming that the mechanism designer knows that there is at least one partially-honest individual in a society of n ≥ 3 individuals, a social choice rule...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011755972