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states of the game, the tipping states, which are determined by the contestants' relative strengths, their distances to final … by which the allocation of prizes are governed by possibly repeated conflict. Our results contribute to an explanation … why. Compared to a single stage conflict, such structures can reduce the overall resources that are dissipated among the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365876
We study equilibrium in a multistage race in which players compete in a sequence of simultaneous move component contests. Players may win a prize for winning each component contest, as well as a prize for winning the overall race. Each component contest is an all-pay auction with complete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365877
In this paper, we generalize the General Lotto game and the Colonel Blotto game to allow for battlefield valuations that are heterogeneous across battlefields and asymmetric across players, and for the players to have asymmetric resource constraints. We completely characterize Nash equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010503467
noise. In pure strategies, any asymmetric equilibrium corresponds to one-sided dominance, but there is also a variety of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012267940
While the game-theoretic analysis of conflict is often based upon the assumption of multiplicative noise, additive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013440075
While the game-theoretic analysis of conflict is often based on the assumption of multiplicative noise, additive noise …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014380413
We introduce three variations of the Hirshleifer-Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict … altogether, often after substantial initial conflict. To attain peace, players must first engage in costly signaling by making …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009771751
We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the … asymmetry and complementarity in members'efforts, and analyze how each group's internal conflict in-fluences its chance of … winning in the external conflict. We find that a more symmetric group may expend more effort in external conflict when the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010467392
nations, as in a strategic game of international conflict handing over military spending decisions to citizens who face a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011452800
We consider a best-of-three Tullock contest between two ex-ante identical players. An effort-maximizing designer commits to a vector of player-specific biases (advantages or disadvantages). In our benchmark model the designer chooses victory-dependent biases (i.e., the biases depend on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012918987