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This paper explores the private and social benefits from barter exchange in a monetized economy. We first prove a no-trade theorem regarding the ability of firms with double-coincidences-of-wants to negotiate improvements in trade among themselves relative to the market outcomes. We then...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011400851
This paper explores the private and social benefits from barter exchange in a monetized economy. We first prove a no-trade theorem regarding the ability of firms with double-coincidences-of-wants to negotiate improvements in trade among themselves relative to the market outcomes. We then...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001623605
This paper explores the private and social benefits from barter exchange in a monetized economy. We first prove a no-trade theorem regarding the ability of firms with double-coincidences-of-wants to negotiate improvements in trade among themselves relative to the market outcomes. We then...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013320760
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003809533
This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agencygame with discrete types and direct revelation mechanisms. After presentinga general algorithm to find the pure-strategy equilibria of this game, we use itto characterize these equilibria when the two principals control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011400396
In the context of common agency adverse-selection games weillustrate that the revelation principle cannot be applied to studyequilibria of the multi-principal games. We then demonstrate thatan extension of the taxation principle what we term the delegation principle can be used to characterize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011400675
This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agency game with direct exter-nalities between principals both under complete and asymmetric information. Direct externalities arise when the contracting variable of one principal affects directly the other principal s payoff....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011400799
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003840892
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001688101
This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agency game with direct externalities between principals both under complete and asymetric information. Direct externalities arise when the contracting variable of one principal affects directly the other pricipal`s payoff....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001624206