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Selection tournaments, sabotage, and participation
Münster, Johannes - 2006
This paper studies sabotage in tournaments with at least three contestants, where the contestants know each other well …. Every contestant has an incentive to direct sabotage specifically against his most dangerous rival. In equilibrium … victims of mobbing are sometimes found to be overachieving. Further, sabotage equalizes promotion chances. The effect is most …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366526
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Preemptive behavior in sequential tournaments
Jost, Peter-J.; Kräkel, Matthias - 2000
sequential tournament, under certain conditions the first acting agent chooses a preemptively high effort so that the following …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335241
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Indenture as a self-enforced contract device : an experimental test
Kritikos, Alexander (contributor);  … - 2009
We experimentally test the efficacy of indenture as a self-enforced contract device. In an indenture game, the principal signals the intention of payment-on-delivery, by tearing a banknote and giving the agent half of it as "prepayment"; the agent receives the completing half after delivering...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003793109
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Uniform and nonuniform staggering of wage contracts
Danziger, Leif - 2010
This paper provides a model that can account for the almost uniform staggering of wage contracts in some countries as well as for the markedly nonuniform staggering in others. In the model, short and long contracts as well as long contracts concluded in different periods are strategic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003982016
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Uniform and nonuniform staggering of wage contracts
Danziger, Leif - 2010
This paper provides a model that can account for the almost uniform staggering of wage contracts in some countries as well as for the markedly nonuniform staggering in others. In the model, short and long contracts as well as long contracts concluded in different periods are strategic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003983623
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Information policy in tournaments with sabotage
Gürtler, Olivier; Münster, Johannes; Nieken, Petra - In: The Scandinavian journal of economics 115 (2013) 3, pp. 932-966
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009778311
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Management takeover battles and the role of the "golden handshake"
Fabel, Oliver; Kolmar, Martin - 2002
The effect of severance pay on management behavior during a takeover battle is generally ambiguous. Yet, the severance payment completely restraining all influence activities always constitutes a "golden handshake." The manager leaving office still benefits from the increase in the merged firm's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009491061
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Gift exchange in the workplace
Dur, Robert A. J. - 2008
We develop a model of manager-employee relationships where employees care more for their manager when they are more convinced that their manager cares for them. Managers can signal their altruistic feelings towards their employees in two ways: by offering a generous wage and by giving attention....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377053
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Mobbers, Robbers, and Warriors : six essays on the theory of contests
Münster, Johannes - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003522539
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Long-term work contracts versus sequential spot markets : experimental evidence on firm-specific investment
Anderhub, Vital; Königstein, Manfred; Kübler, Dorothea - 1999
Dismissal rules, i.e. legally enforced long term contracts, have beem defended against criticism for, among other things, providing efficient incentives to invest in relationship specific skills. However, in many situations efficient investment can also be attained by spot contracts. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580472