evaluation to the agent if the evaluation turns out to be bad. The justification assures the agent that the principal has not … her evaluation. For good performance, however, the principal pays a constant high wage without justification. Furthermore …Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? In this paper the principal's evaluation is private …

This paper studies the effect of disclosing conflicts of interest on strategic communication when the sender has lying … costs. I present a simple economic mechanism under which such disclosure often leads to more informative and, at the same … or delegating receivers. Disclosure is thus not a Pareto-improvement among receivers. I identify general conditions of …

derive the optimal contract for both experimentation and production when the agent has private information about his … asymmetric information is endogenously determined by the length of the experimentation stage. An optimal contract uses the length …

We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and …

the principal at the communication stage affects our results. …

In this paper, we consider a symmetric rent-seeking contest, where employees lobby for a governmental contract on … behalf of firms. The only verifiable information is which firm is assigned the contract. We derive the optimal wage contracts … of the employees and analyze, whether commitment by determining the wage contract prior to the competitor is profitable …