Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 2,677
Cover Image
Explicit versus implicit contracts for dividing the benefits of cooperation
Casari, Marco; Cason, Timothy N. - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 85 (2013) 1, pp. 20-34
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009708801
Cover Image
Fairness and contract design
Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2005 - This version: November 5, 2005
provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit incentive contracts when there are some fair-minded players. But …, which offer important new insights into the interaction of contract choices, fairness and incentives. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371080
Cover Image
Contracts, fairness, and incentives
Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2004 - This version: March 31, 2004
actors provide powerful incentives and become superior when there are some fair-minded players. The principals understand … enforcement power of explicit and implicit incentives. This contract preference is associated with the fact that explicit … incentives weaken the enforcement power of implicit bonus incentives significantly. Our results are largely consistent with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010440446
Cover Image
Relational Contracting, Negotiation, and External Enforcement
Miller, David A.; Olsen, Trond E.; Watson, Joel - 2018
We study relational contracting and renegotiation in environments with external enforcement of long-term contractual arrangements. An external, long-term contract governs the stage games the contracting parties will play in the future (depending on verifiable stage-game outcomes) until they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014033653
Cover Image
Fairness, incentives and contractual incompleteness
Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2001
We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral … incentives and become superior when there are also fair-minded players. These predictions are strongly supported by the results …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398105
Cover Image
Optimal contracts with a risk-taking agent
Barron, Daniel; Georgiadis, George; Swinkels, Jeroen M. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 2, pp. 715-761
Consider an agent who can costlessly add mean-preserving noise to his output. To deter such risk-taking, the principal optimally offers a contract that makes the agent's utility concave in output. If the agent is risk-neutral and protected by limited liability, this concavity constraint binds...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308620
Cover Image
Reference points, social norms, and fairness in contract renegotiations : conference paper
Bartling, Björn; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2013
Do contracts provide reference points that affect ex post behavior? We address this question in a canonical buyer-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant and economically important impact on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010342843
Cover Image
Communicating subjective evaluations
Lang, Matthias - 2012 - this version: August 2013
Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? In this paper the principal's evaluation is private information, but she can provide justification by sending a costly cheap-talk message. I show that the principal explains her evaluation to the agent if the evaluation turns out to be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009569527
Cover Image
Insurance Agency Contract with ‘No Claim Bonus’
Sarkar, Sumit - 2019
Traditionally insurance agents are incentivised by payment of a commission on the premium they generate. A bonus payment received by the agent from the insurer, when the insured does not make a claim, is referred to as ‘No claim bonus' (NCB). NCB rewards the agent for her / his effort in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012901106
Cover Image
Contracts that Reward Innovation : Delegated Experimentation with an Informed Principal
Sun, Yiman - 2018
is either a separating equilibrium or a pooling one. Due to the interaction between the signaling incentives of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012932065