We analyze a college admissions game with asymmetric information between students and colleges. Students' preferences … for colleges depend on the observable quality of the schools. In contrast, colleges' preferences for students depend on … the latter's abilities, which are private information. Students and schools are matched via a decentralized mechanism in …

2013. Costly mistakes have externalities: they transfer tuition waivers from high- to low-socioeconomic status students …, and increase the number of students attending college. To shed light on the mechanisms underlying mistakes, we exploit a …

provided while students make choices. We consider two variations of IDAM: one in which they are only informed about whether … they are tentatively accepted or not (IDAM-NC) and one in which students are additionally informed at each step of the …

We introduce a new mechanism for matching students to schools or universities, denoted Iterative Deferred Acceptance … Mechanism (IDAM), inspired by procedures currently being used to match millions of students to public universities in Brazil and … would accept her given the current set of students choosing that college. Although the induced sequential game has no …