In the context of an allocation game, this paper analyses the proposerś reported beliefs about the responderś willingness to accept (or reject) the proposed split of the pie. The proposerś beliefs are elicited via a quadratic scoring rule. An econometric model of the proposerś beliefs is...

This paper develops a framework for estimating Quantal Response Equilibrium models from experimental data using Bayesian techniques. Bayesian techniques offer some advantages over the more commonly-used maximum likelihood approach: (i) the accuracy of the posterior simulation is limited by...

Since the seminal contribution of Jackson & Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between individual strategic behavior and collective outcome. What has...

This paper studies the properties of convexity (concavity) and strategic complements (substitutes) in network formation and the implications for the structure of pairwise stable networks. First, different definitions of convexity (concavity) in own links from the literature are put into the...

We investigate the possibility of statistical evaluation of the market completeness for discrete timestock market models. It is known that the market completeness isnot a robust property: small random deviations of the coefficientsconvert a complete market model into a incomplete one. The...

The empirical analysis of discrete complete-information games has relied on behavioral restrictions in the form of solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium. Choosing the right solution concept is crucial not just for identification of payoff parameters, but also for the validity and...

Using virtual stock markets with artificial interacting software investors, aka agent-based models (ABMs), we present a method to reverse engineer real-world financial time series. We model financial markets as made of a large number of interacting boundedly rational agents. By optimizing the...

In a series of one-shot linear public goods game, we ask subjects to report their contributions, their contribution plans for the next period, and their first-order beliefs about their present and future partner. We estimate subjects' preferences from plans data by a infinite mixture approach...

Game-theoretic models are frequently employed to study strategic interaction between agents. Empirical research has focused on estimating payoff functions while maintaining strong assumptions regarding the information structure of the game. I show how to relax informational assumptions to...

We show nonparametric point identification of static binary games with incomplete information, using excluded regressors. An excluded regressor for player ¡ is a state variable that does not affect other players' utility and is additively separable from other components in ¡'s payoff. When...