We analyze how leniency affects cartel pricing in an infinitely-repeated oligopoly model where the fine rates are … linked to illegal gains and detection probabilities depend on the degree of collusion. A novel aspect of this study is that … we focus on the worst possible outcome. We investigate the maximal cartel price, the largest price for which the …

collusion. We introduce cartel culture that describes how likely cartels persist after each conviction. Our analysis … disentangles the effects of traditional antitrust regulation, leniency, and cartel strategies. Without rewards to the strictly …We analyze maximal cartel prices in infinitely-repeated oligopoly models under leniency where fines are linked to …

join its syndicate to complete production. Using repeated extensive form games, we show that collusion in syndicated … markets may become easier as market concentration falls, and that market entry may facilitate collusion. In particular, firms … can sustain collusion by refusing to syndicate with any firm that undercuts the collusive price (and thereby raising that …

detection activities. Antitrust fines obey four legal principles: punishments should fit the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy … lower price by making it more attractive than collusion on higher prices. For a range of low cartel prices, the fine is set …We study antitrust enforcement that channels price-fixing incentives through setting fines and allocating resources to …

In this paper we set out the welfare economics based case for imposing cartel penalties on the cartel overcharge rather … of a penalty based on the cartel overcharge with three other penalty regimes: fixed penalties; penalties based on revenue … conjunction with the above result, our analysis of cartel stability (and thus deterrence), shows that penalties based on the …

The experimental literature on antitrust enforcement provides robust evidence that communication plays an important … innocuous communication and communication about a cartel, sanctioning only the latter. To this aim, we introduce a participant …