We analyse the combined effects of bargaining power, managerial ability/effort, and risk-taking strategies on the choice of hedge fund (HF) incentive contracts, and hedge fund performance. In our model, the HF manager and outside investors first negotiate over the type of contract (asymmetric or...

In the UK over the last decade, benchmarking has been consistently promoted as a solution to the problems of industry and the construction industry in particular. Government support of benchmarking in construction through the development of a key performance indicators programme found...

We develop a dynamic credit risk model for the case that banks compete to collect their loans from a firm falling in danger of bankruptcy. We apply a game-theoretic real options approach to investigate bankfs optimal strategies. Our model reveals that the bank with the larger loan amount, namely...

We develop a dynamic credit risk model for the case in which banks compete to collect their loans from a firm in danger of bankruptcy. We apply a game-theoretic real options approach to investigate banksf optimal strategies. Our model reveals that the bank with the larger loan amount, namely,...

CoCo's (contingent convertible capital) are designed to convert from debt to equity when banks need it most. Using a Diamond-Dybvig model cast in a global games framework, we show that while the CoCo conversion of the issuing bank may bring the bank back into compliance with capital...

I utilize bondholder wealth e ffects to test theories of why voluntary bank debt renegotiation happens without any default. Bondholders react positively to renegotiations that relax loan covenants, consistent with Gârleanu and Zwiebel (2009) that lenders transfer control rights back to the fi...

This paper investigates the importance and the determinants of trust in a lending situation using an online controlled experiment. We find that communication can facilitate collaboration between lenders and borrowers through three channels of trust: 1) an information channel, 2) a preference...

I provide new evidence on the renegotiation of financial contracts using a comprehensive sample of over 90,000 debt contract renegotiations. I study whether the demand for monitoring determines the renegotiation intensity, defined as either the renegotiation frequency over a period of time or...

We study a new model to study the effect of contract externalities that arise through shock transmission. We model a financial network where good firms enjoy direct and indirect benefits from linking with one another. Bad risks benefit from having a connection with a good firm, but they are a...

Reputation concerns in credit markets restrain borrowers' temptations to take excessive risk. The strength of these concerns depends on the behavior of other borrowers, rendering the reputational discipline fragile and subject to breakdowns without obvious changes in economic fundamentals....