In Turkey, after the 1999 Gölcük Earthquake, urban redevelopment has been seen as a major solution for removal or rehabilitation of low quality urban settlements. Several laws and bylaws have been passed to this end. One of the major tasks of this transformation and/or redevelopment is to...

A model of interregional competition for the location of new (production) facilities by a location decision maker (LDM) is analyzed as a differential game. Two regions try to enhance their attraction by making concessions to the LDM in order to raise the probability that a new facility will be...

Some questions in the study of public administration are difficult to answer on the basis of field research. A field of inquiry may be absent, as in the case of research that seeks to explore future outcomes of present policies, or of policies that are still being developed. Another example is...

This paper analyses how different types of access regulation to next generation networks affect investments and consumer welfare. The model consists of an investment stage with uncertain returns and subsequent quantity competition. The access price is a function of investment costs and the...

We investigate the effect of competition on quality in regulated markets (e.g., health care, higher education, public utilities), using a Hotelling framework, in the presence of sluggish demand. We take a differential-game approach, and derive the open-loop solution (providers choose the optimal...

This paper analyzes "Influence Peddling" with interaction between human capital transfer and collusion-building aspects in a model, in which each government official regulates multiple firms simultaneously. We show that (i) there exists an "optimal" division rule for collusion between a sequence...

This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agencygame with discrete types and direct revelation mechanisms. After presentinga general algorithm to find the pure-strategy equilibria of this game, we use itto characterize these equilibria when the two principals control...

In the context of common agency adverse-selection games weillustrate that the revelation principle cannot be applied to studyequilibria of the multi-principal games. We then demonstrate thatan extension of the taxation principle what we term the delegation principle can be used to characterize...

This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agency game with direct exter-nalities between principals both under complete and asymmetric information. Direct externalities arise when the contracting variable of one principal affects directly the other principal s payoff....