Showing 1 - 10 of 2,085
The aim of this paper is to explain the relevance of the theory of indirect communication strategy and negotiating … conflict. Based on Thomas Schelling illustrates indirect communication cases: bribery and threats. It shows that both bribery … also contributes to the theory of strategic games very different from zero. Indirect communication is a fundamental basis …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014200330
The effects of pre-play communication in a coordination game with incomplete information about players' intensity of … preferences are compared to no communication controls. Pre-play communication significantly increases subjects' payoffs and the … probability of coordination, while reducing miscoordination. This results from communication being largely informative, in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012922707
Consider a society where ethnic conflict is imminent due to people's belief about the state of the world. An `informed agent' is a player who has private information about the state. We analyze whether the informed agent can achieve peace by sending private messages to the players. If the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012904240
nodes in a communication network. However, communication through the network is noisy, which removes common knowledge about …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011600156
action than a player with lesser damage. Furthermore, we examine cheap-talk communication equilibria with the extremist. The … not exist any other communication equilibrium for either kind of extremist, for any other combination of player types …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014093382
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383876
We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test … sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Third, communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010502689
Two individuals are involved in a conflict situation in which preferences are ex ante uncertain. While they eventually learn their own preferences, they have to pay a small cost if they want to learn their opponent's preferences. We show that, for sufficiently small positive costs of information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011412685
Costly delay in negotiations can induce the negotiating parties to be more forthcoming with their information and improve the quality of the collective decision. Imposing a deadline may result in stalling, in which players at some point stop making concessions but switch back to conceding at the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011690720
equilibrium outcome of the contest with pre-play communication. This is so because the weakest type of the underdog will try to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011805749