We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and … either core stability or strict core stability is under consideration, the existence problem of a stable coalition structure … stable coalition structure and of an individually stable coalition structure turn out to be NP-complete in the strong sense …

(overlapping climate clubs) to reduce CO2 emissions. R&D provision in clubs produces two types of positive externalities: a global … multilateral coalitional structures are not stable; however, the size of the stable coalition increases as the economy expands. …

We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and … either core stability or strict core stability is under consideration, the existence problem of a stable coalition structure … stable coalition structure and of an individually stable coalition structure turn out to be NP-complete in the strong sense …

sharing scheme is particularly powerful for economic problems that are characterized by positive externalities from coalition …We propose a class of sharing schemes for the distribution of the gains from cooperation for coalition games with … externalities. In the context of the partition function, it is shown that any member of this class of sharing schemes leads to the …

This chapter surveys recent models of coalition and network formation in a unified framework. Comparisons are drawn … among various procedures of network and coalition formation, involving simultaneous and sequential moves. The survey also … discussion of efficient network and coalition formation procedures and directions for future research. …

been more and more substituted by majority voting in order to speed up decision-making processes in a Union of 27 … member state threatens to leave the Union. By using cheap talk a member state may increase the credibility of its outside …

? Under an intuitive condition linking power structures in the dynamic setting and at the commitment stage, the answer is … equilibrium without commitment. The condition is also necessary: when it fails, as in the case of a single time-inconsistent agent …, commitment is valuable for some payoffs. We apply our result to explain inefficient collective decisions in the contexts of …