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Inefficiency and regulation in credence goods markets with altruistic experts

Farukh, Razi; Kerkhof, Anna; Loebbing, Jonas - 2020

We study a credence goods problem - that is, a moral hazard problem with non-contractible outcome - where altruistic experts (the agents) care both about their income and the utility of consumers (the principals). Experts' preferences over income and their consumers' utility are convex, such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012431181

Contract design with limited commitment

Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim - 2018

-to-use tool to analyze contracting problems with limited commitment. We apply the solution concept to a setting with a continuous …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946012

Competition and Quality in Regulated Markets with Sluggish Demand

Brekke, Kurt R. - 2010

We investigate the effect of competition on quality in regulated markets (e.g., health care, higher education, public utilities), using a Hotelling framework, in the presence of sluggish demand. We take a differential-game approach, and derive the open-loop solution (providers choose the optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013148292

Competition and quality in regulated markets with sluggish demand

Brekke, Kurt R.; Cellini, Roberto; Siciliani, Luigi; … - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935230

Empowerment and the dark side of delegation

Kräkel, Matthias - 2018

preferences of principal and agent are exogenously aligned. As application, the commitment effect of empowerment is considered … without task commitment and other behavioral effects the principal might forgo delegation though being efficient. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011795221

The strategic use of abatement by a polluting monopoly

Martín Herrán, Guiomar; Rubio, Santiago J. - 2016

This paper evaluates the effects of the lack of regulatory commitment on emission tax applied by the regulator … find that the lack of commitment leads to lower taxation and abatement that yield larger emissions and, consequently, a … social welfare. Thus, our analysis indicates that the lack of commitment has a negative impact of welfare although this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011547525

When trust fades... : can optimal mechanisms for policy decisions always be designed?

Major, Iván - 2013

Governments must usually take policy decisions with an imperfect knowledge of the economic actors' type or the actors' effort level. These issues are addressed within the framework of classic adverse selection or moral hazard models. I discuss in this paper how would the government’s and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010211955

Three Principles of Competitive Nonlinear Pricing

Page, Frank H.; Monteiro, Paulo Klinger - 2002

We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First, we establish a competitive analog to the revelation principle which we call the implementation principle. This principle provides a complete characterization of all incentive compatible, indirect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014033695

The Hidden Value of Lying : Evasion of Guilt in Expert Advice

Khalmetski, Kiryl - 2014

I develop a model of strategic communication between an uninformed receiver and a partially informed sender who is averse to lying. The sender's cost of lying is endogenous, depending on the receiver's beliefs induced by the sender's message, rather than on its exogenous formulation. Such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013062525

Common agency equilibria with discrete mechanisms and discrete types

Martimort, David; Stole, Lars A. - 2001

This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agencygame with discrete types and direct revelation mechanisms. After presentinga general algorithm to find the pure-strategy equilibria of this game, we use itto characterize these equilibria when the two principals control...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011400396