Showing 1 - 10 of 181
Since the seminal contribution of Jackson & Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between individual strategic behavior and collective outcome. What has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009452539
This paper studies the properties of convexity (concavity) and strategic complements (substitutes) in network formation and the implications for the structure of pairwise stable networks. First, different definitions of convexity (concavity) in own links from the literature are put into the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009452561
about job openings, bargaining power etc. Given these beneficial aspects of networks, the stability is in question: How do … networks.Finally, one of the focal topics of strategic network formation is the "tension of stability and efficiency" (see …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009452644
Since the seminal contribution of Jackson & Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between individual strategic behavior and collective outcome. What has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272547
This paper studies the properties of convexity (concavity) and strategic complements (substitutes) in network formation and the implications for the structure of pairwise stable networks. First, different definitions of convexity (concavity) in own links from the literature are put into the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272600
A refinement of the set of Nash equilibria that satisfies two assumptions is shown to select a subset that is stable in the sense defined by Kohlberg and Mertens. One assumption requires that a selected set is invariant to adjoining redundant strategies and the other is a strong version of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599369
A refinement of the set of Nash equilibria that satisfies two assumptions is shown to select a subset that is stable in the sense defined by Kohlberg and Mertens. One assumption requires that a selected set is invariant to adjoining redundant strategies and the other is a strong version of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515738
In this paper, we use experimental data to study players' stability in normal-form games where subjects have to report … without feedback. We document a high degree of stability within the same (strategically equivalent) game, although time and … changes in the presentation of the game do lead to less stability. To look at stability across different games, we adopt the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107567
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004993101
of being stable and/or effective. This paper focuses on computing stability in a game on multiple coalition formation … outlined. To compute stability, the new notation is used for implementation into computer coding. Implementation and … computation aspects are discussed. Numerical illustration of the algorithm shows that stability varies with the applied membership …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067833