How much information about financial institutions' balance sheets should regulators pass on to the market? To minimize the probability of inefficient default, the regulator optimally designs a disclosure regime that imposes transparency when the firm has weak fundamentals and opacity, otherwise....

We study a general static noisy rational expectations model, where investors have private information about asset payoffs, with common and private components, and about their own exposure to an aggregate risk factor, and derive conditions for existence and uniqueness (or multiplicity) of...

We consider a cheap talk game with a sender who has a reputational concern for an ability to predict a state of the world correctly, and where receivers may misunderstand the message sent. When communication between the sender and each receiver is private, we identify an equilibrium in which the...

We allow a strategic trader to choose when to acquire information about an asset's payoff, instead of endowing her with it. When the trader dynamically controls the precision of a flow of information, the optimal precision evolves stochastically and increases with market liquidity. However,...

The current SEC regulation section 13(f) allows financial institutions to delay the disclosure of their quarter-end stock holdings up to 45 days. Motivated by a recent regulatory debate about the appropriate length of delay for disclosures, I develop a model to examine a financial institution's...

This paper performs a welfare analysis of markets with private information in which agents can condition on noisy prices in the rational expectations tradition. Price-contingent strategies introduce two externalities in the use of private information: a payoff (pecuniary) externality related to...

We study a unique Chinese dataset of equity analysts' on-site visits to publicly listed companies. We find that analyst silence (no release of report from visit date to the next quarterly earnings announcement) contains information that negatively impacts both stock returns and earnings...

The impact finance market has sought to 'internalise externalities and adjust risk perceptions' (G20 Green Finance Study Group, 2016), demonstrating the private sector's capability in resolving the climate free-rider problem through the 'greening' of economic activities, partially bypassing...

I study a level-k reasoning equilibrium in an asymmetric information environment populated by informed/uninformed agents and noise speculators. The approach provides a bridge between disclosing information and fractions of market participants, and sheds new light on the effects of information...

Mediator proposals can accelerate agreement and increase welfare even if the mediator is entirely uninformed. We demonstrate this by adding random mediation to the Cramton (1992) bargaining model. Mediation increases welfare by pooling types, which reduces signaling costs. When mediation is...