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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010188979
regression analysis yields a measure of the relative importance of priors and signals on subjects’ beliefs on contributions and … of beliefs. We argue that the sustainability of cooperation is related to this pattern of belief formation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752899
We examine the role of cooperative preferences, beliefs, and punishments to uncover potential cross … beliefs explain cooperation - we show that cooperation is mostly driven by differences in beliefs rather than cooperative … subject pools and highlights the central role of beliefs in explaining differences in voluntary cooperation within and across …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014335871
We examine the role of cooperative preferences, beliefs, and punishments to uncover potential cross … beliefs explain cooperation - we show that cooperation is mostly driven by differences in beliefs rather than cooperative … subject pools and highlights the central role of beliefs in explaining differences in voluntary cooperation within and across …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014338895
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012173227
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009702473
We investigate experimentally whether the extent of conditional cooperation in public good games depends on the marginal return to the public good and type of game. The marginal return is varied from 0.2 to 0.4 to 0.8. The "standard" game, in which three players contribute before a follower, is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010228325
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010443016
-shared conclusion that cooperation observed in experiments (and its collapse)is mostly driven by imperfect reciprocity. In this study … observed. We are thus driven to the conclusion that egoism is more resistant to exposure to social dilemmas than reciprocity. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012107753
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