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There are many situations in which a customer's proclivity to buy the product of any firm depends not only on the classical attributes of the product such as its price and quality, but also on who else is buying the same product. We model these situations as games in which firms compete for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593259
This paper examines the phenomenon of management-initiated, court-supervised reorganization of companies in U.S. bankruptcy court. The proposed in-court persuasion mechanism reconciles excessive reorganizations of non-viable companies (and subsequent repeat failures) with management-initiated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011779720
This paper studies a selling mechanism where the seller first charges a fee for advice (information structure) then sells a product. When the buyer has no private information, the seller can extract full surplus, both when the seller has private information and when he doesn't. If only the buyer...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011717204
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This paper investigates a contest in information revelation between firms that seek to persuade consumers by revealing positive own information and negative information about the rival. In the face of limited bandwidth, firms are forced to make a trade-off between disclosing their own positive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013249789
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This paper studies the revelation principle for mechanisms with limited commitment when agents have correlated persistent types over the infinite horizon. After characterizing necessary and sufficient conditions to construct a mechanism with same ex-ante payoffs and interim beliefs to all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012050802
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This paper studies mechanism design with limited commitment where agents have persistent correlated types over the infinite horizon. The mechanism designer now faces the informed-principal problem in addition to usual issues with i.i.d. types. With an infinite horizon and nondurable good, there...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011973944
The commitment ability of governments is neither infinite nor zero but intermediate. In this paper, we determine the commitment ability that a government needs to implement a unique equilibrium outcome and rule out self-fulfilling expectations. We show that, in a large class of static...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014635394