Showing 1 - 10 of 1,227
Purpose This paper aims to argue that Economics is not a neutral science. Design/methodology/approach Post-structuralist perspective of Lyotard (1984), alongside the Pragmatics of Searle (1979) and Travis (1981) are useful for analyzing enunciations in mainstream Economics. Findings Economists...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418082
This paper extends the team production theory pioneered by Holmstrom (1982) with a team signaling model. In the model, the team's output acts as a signal of the team's ability, and thus is valuable for the team members. The team members will cooperate to some extent to signal a speci fic type,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199519
In many facets of life, we often face competition with a multilayered structure in which different levels of competition take place simultaneously. In this paper, we propose a new class of tournament models, called multilayered tournaments, to capture this type of competitive environment. Among...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014154884
Principal-agent models in which the agent has access to private information before a contract is signed are a cornerstone of contract theory. We have conducted an experiment with 720 participants to explore whether the theoretical insights are reflected by the behavior of subjects in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014162484
This paper analyses a dynamic inspection game between a principal and agent where the agent has private information about his binary type. The principal strictly prefers employing the high type to his outside option, and the outside option to the low type. Every period, the agent can either...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014103834
We show that contracting in agency with voluntary participation may involve incentives for the agent's abstention. Their provision alters the optimality criteria in the principal's decision-making, further distorts the mechanism, and may lead to breakdown of contracting in circumstances where...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013021575
This paper considers general games in which multiple informed principals simultaneously compete to influence the decisions of a common agent. It shows that we can characterize all outcomes of any game in which principals delegate the final decisions to the agent using arbitrary mechanisms, by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013028126
This paper proposes a general competing mechanism game of incomplete information where a mechanism allows its designer to send a message to himself at the same time agents send messages. This paper introduces a notion of robust equilibrium. If each agent’s payoff function is separable with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013226689
This paper studies the optimal refund mechanism when an uninformed buyer can privately acquire information about his valuation over time. In principle, a refund mechanism can specify the odds that the seller requires the product returned while issuing a (partial) refund, which we call stochastic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013493000
We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard: Principals compete through mechanisms in the presence of agents who take unobservable actions. In this context, we provide a rationale for restricting principals to make use of simple mechanisms, which correspond to direct...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013123960