In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they … may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that four-firm industries form cartels more often than duopolies because they …

implicitly and explicitly), if at all, in such games. In our treatments without communication, players fail to cooperate and … essentially play the static Nash equilibrium (consistent with previous results). With communication, inefficient firms gain at the …

implicitly and explicitly), if at all, in such games. We find that, without communication, players fail to cooperate and … essentially play the static Nash equilibrium, confirming previous results. With communication, inefficient firms gain at the …

on firms' price setting behavior in a 2x2 factorial design experiment with and without communication and under present … which correlate with market outcomes and communication's effectiveness. The results have implications for antitrust policy …

experiments with written cheap-talk communication between players and we compare them to treatments without the possibility to …Factors facilitating collusion may not successfully predict cartel occurrence: when a factor predicts that collusion … tacitly but that the number of firms does not significantly affect outcomes with communication. As a result, the payoff gain …

-stage cartel formation experiment where multiple ringleaders may emerge. Although theory predicts that cartels will always be …

-stage cartel formation experiment where multiple ringleaders may emerge. Although theory predicts that cartels will always be …

Cartels can severely harm social welfare. Competition authorities introduced leniency rules to destabilize existing … cartels and hinder the formation of new ones. Empirically, it is difficult to judge the success of these measures because … functioning cartels are unobservable. Existing experimental studies confirm that a leniency rule indeed reduces cartelization. We …