Over the last two decades, differential game (DG) models have been used extensively to study such issues in dynamic environments as competitive advertising and pricing for new products in the marketing literature, capacity investments in the energy industry, government's subsidy policy in new...

Stackelberg differential game models have been used to study sequential decision making in non-cooperative games in diverse fields. In this paper, we survey recent applications of Stackelberg differential game models to the supply chain management and marketing channels literatures. A common...

One's own emotions may influence someone else's behavior in a social interaction. If one believes this, s/he has an incentive to game emotions-to strategically modify the expression of a current emotional state-in an attempt to influence her/his counterpart. In a series of three experiments,...

In a world where everyone we know is either a push or click of a “send” button away, it seems that our methods of communications have become less ethical with each push & click. The impersonality of our digital world has given us a shield of radio frequencies and a human disconnect within...

This study considers the "rational negotiator model" (homo - negotiator) as a new scientific logical standard for negotiation studies, and proposes axioms, definitions, and principles of the rational negotiator model that are essential for this purpose. In negotiation studies, it is common to...

Purpose: This paper aims to develop a theoretical framework for profit allocation, as a mechanism for aligning incentives, in collaborative supply chains. Design/methodology/approach: The issue of profit distribution is approached from a game-theoretic perspective. We use the nucleolus concept....

Purpose: We expand a previous discussion in this journal by proposing a new solution concept, based on game theory, for profit allocation with the aim of aligning incentives in collaborative supply chains. Design/methodology/approach: Through the Gately's notion of propensity to disrupt, we...