Showing 1 - 10 of 314
Two groups produce a network good perceived by a third party, such as a police or military institution, as a "public bad", referred to as "crime" for simplicity. These two groups, considered mafias, are assumed to be antagonists, whether they are enemies or competitors in the same market,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014636243
Does the cultural background influence the success with which genetically unrelated individuals cooperate in social dilemma situations? In this paper we provide an answer by analyzing the data of Herrmann et al. (Science 2008, pp. 1362-1367), who study cooperation and punishment in sixteen...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003974191
This paper presents a model which focuses on differences between the competition policy of the EU and antitrust of the U.S. It introduces three versions - Neutral, American, and European. Two-stage game model takes the authority’s perspective and describes options and behavior of antitrust...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009408670
This paper investigates gender differences in donating behavior in double-anonymous dictator game experiments. To do so, we developed a new treatment where researchers can connect the gender of a dictator to her/his donation amount despite both female and male dictators being gathered in a room...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012960152
Bernheim and Whinston (1986) show that, in a common agency problem without budget constraints, the set of Nash equilibria with truthful strategies (TNE), the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria (CPNE), and the principal-optimal core of the underlying coalitional game exist and are all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012998930
We conduct a laboratory experiment to study the incentives of a privileged group to share political power with another group when the two have conflicting interests. There are two groups of participants, the “yellows” and the “blues”. The yellows collectively choose the voting rule for a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014149190
Many conflicts in numerous parts of the developing world can be traced to disputes over land ownership, land use and land degradation. In this paper we test the hypothesis that differences in knowledge structures on land tenure and market systems between different leaders within these countries...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014126965
We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games with incomplete information and continuous contributions. We consider contribution and subscription games. We show that every equilibrium is inefficient. We also provide a sufficient condition for 'contributing zero' to be the unique equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014168390
First, the paper lays out the fun-damental assumptions underlying the game theoretical analysis of international environmental problems. Second it summarises important findings which help to explain the difficulties of co-operation and discusses remedies. Chapter 3 looks at measures to avoid...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608649
We consider conflicts between an incumbent, e.g. government or dominant firm, and potential challengers, e.g. guerilla movement or entrants. It is not uncommon for challengers to win such conflicts despite their lack of resources. They can do this by exploiting a second mover advantage: choosing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010290657