Background: This paper develops a game theoretic model that analyses the dynamics of competition among the leading domestic aviation firms in the Nigerian aviation industry. It probes the abilities of the prisoner dilemma to describe the subjective behaviour of the firms, which provide a...

There are many situations in which a customer's proclivity to buy the product of any firm depends not only on the classical attributes of the product such as its price and quality, but also on who else is buying the same product. We model these situations as games in which firms compete for...

In this paper, I identify and examine a class of normative theories that may cause rational managers to inadvertently destroy firm value in equilibrium. The problem occurs when firms take prescribed actions that result in the outcomes predicted by the theory, even though the theory rests upon...

In this paper, we take a first step toward exploring empirically the product assortment strategies of oligopolistic firms. Our starting point is a discrete-choice demand model for differentiated products. We incorporate the demand model into an equilibrium supply model, in which firms compete by...

This paper proposes a strategic model of entry that allows for positive and negative spillovers among firms. The model is applied to a novel dataset containing information about the store configurations of all US regional shopping centers and is used to quantify the magnitude of inter-store...

This paper derives a three stage Cournot-oligopoly game for product innovation, expenditure on introducing the product and competition on the product market. Product innovation is assumed to increase consumer utility but is effective only if the innovating firm invests in marketing, so that...

This paper considers a strategic delegation setting with R&D spillovers in a Cournot market. The game we analyze has four stages. First, owners have the option to hire a manager. If they decide to delegate, then in the contracting stage they have to determine the optimal incentives for the...

This survey presents in a historical way the main contributions to the hardcore theory of aggregative games and the applications of this model to several fields of economics, other social sciences and engineering

Costly competitions between economic agents are modeled as contests. Researchers use laboratory experiments to study contests and test comparative static predictions of contest theory. Commonly, researchers find that participants' efforts are significantly higher than predicted by the standard...

In a bilateral monopoly, we are looking at the seller's incentives to propose an improved widget design under two different negotiation rules. With Renegotiation, the players negotiate a price after a design has been agreed upon, and with Commitment, they negotiate the price beforehand. The...