We develop a model of contests on networks. Each player is “connected” to a set of contests and exerts a single effort to increase the probability of winning each contest to which she is connected. We characterize equilibria under the Tullock contest success function and explore how behavior...

Economic agents often care about their relative well-being: they compare with their neighbors in a social network. In this case, which network structures permit stable allocations? We construct a model in which agents' payoffs depend on the ranking of their allocations among the payoffs of their...

Situations that require individuals to mutually cooperate are often analysed as coordination games. This paper proposes a model of cooperative network formation where the network is formed through the process of the coordination game being played between multiple agents. Additionally, network...

In this paper, we develop a new game theoretic network centrality measure based on the Shapley value. To do so, we consider a coalitional game, where the worth of each coalition is the total play in the game introduced in Ballester et al. (2006). We first establish that the game is convex. As a...

This study revisits the problem of the tragedy of the commons. Extracting agents participate in an evolutionary game in a complex social network and are subject to social pressure if they do not comply with the social norms. Social pressure depends on the dynamics of the resource, the network...

In this paper, we describe a series of laboratory experiments that implement specific examples of a more general network structure and we examine equilibrium selection. Specifically, actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements, and participants have either complete or...

This chapter surveys recent models of coalition and network formation in a unified framework. Comparisons are drawn among various procedures of network and coalition formation, involving simultaneous and sequential moves. The survey also covers models of group and network formation by farsighted...