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underlying implementation duality. We show how this duality can be used to obtain a sharpening of the taxation principle, to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010499578
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010503462
We consider an in nitely repeated reappointment game in a principal- agent relationship. Typical examples are voter-politician or government- public servant relationships. The agent chooses costly effort and enjoys being in office until he is deselected. The principal observes a noisy signal of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010221102
We show that Ergin & Sönmez's (2006) results which show that for schools it is a dominant strategy to truthfully rank the students under the Boston mechanism, and that the Nash equilibrium outcomes in undominated strategies of the induced game are stable, rely crucially on two assumptions....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011473711
We characterize the complete set of equilibrium allocations to an intrinsic common agency screening game as the set of solutions to self-generating optimization programs. We provide a complete characterization of equilibrium outcomes for regular environments by relying on techniques developed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011937306
We study the relationship between two-agent implementation problems and the notionof interim efficiency due to …, Bayesianefficiency, and show that it is sufficient for implementation of social choice functions.We also show that this condition is … sufficient for implementation of social choice setsunder a weak domain restriction - in particular, no economic condition is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012852742
This paper studies a stability notion and matching processes in the job market with incomplete information on the workers' side. Each worker is associated with a type, and each firm cares about the type of her employee under a match. Moreover, firms' information structure is described by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159014
We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise-stable set coincides with the pairwise-stable set and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011703024
I study a many-to-many, two-sided, transferable utility matching game. Consider data on matches or relationships between agents but not on the choice set of each agent. I investigate what economic parameters can be learned from data on equilibrium matches and agent characteristics. Features of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011754942
We develop a model of assignment games with pairwise-identitydependent externalities. A concept of conjectural equilibrium is proposed, and the universal conjecture is shown to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the general existence of equilibrium. We then apply the solution concept...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191642