In this paper, we develop the game-theoretic electricity market model ElStorM that includes the possibility of strategic electricity storage. We apply the model to the German electricity market and analyze different realistic and counterfactual cases of strategic and non-strategic pumped hydro...

We propose a unified framework bridging the gap between team and competition issues, in order to reconsider the social value of private and public information in price and quantity games under imperfect and dispersed information, and to compare the corresponding outcomes in terms of equilibrium...

This paper uses an aggregative games framework to predict consumer welfare when market structure is endogenously determined. Our main results characterize mergers whose synergies reduce consumer welfare by inducing rivals to exit. The conditions under which such mergers arise are broad,...

Market mechanism may or may not throw up compatibility in markets for systems where network effect arises due to complementarity of component parts of a system. We consider a game, where, in stage 1, the firms decide whether to standardise on a single technological platform or not and at the...

This paper presents a new method for estimating discrete games based on bounds of conditional choice probabilities. The method does not require solving the game and is scalable to models with many firms and many discrete decisions. We apply the method to study merger effects on firm entry and...

In this paper, we investigate the profitability of horizontal mergers of firms with price adjustments. We take a differential game approach and both the open-loop as well as the closed-loop equlibria are considered. We show that the merger incentive is determined by how fast the price adapts to...

Dams are essential for water storage and hydropower generation, but change river flow patterns and endanger local environments. Dam projects may further exacerbate already existing problems in trans-boundary rivers. We consider three scenarios of institutional factors: (1) each country pursues...

How should we evaluate the welfare implications of improvements to safety technologies in the presence of offsetting behavior? We model this problem as a symmetric game in which each player's payoff depends on his own action and the average action of the other players, and analyze under which...

How should we evaluate the welfare implications of improvements to safety technologies in the presence of offsetting behavior? We model this problem as a symmetric game in which each player's payoff depends on his own action and the average action of the other players, and analyze under which...

We perform a controlled experiment to study the welfare effects of competition in a strategic communication environment. Two equally informed senders with conflicting interests can misreport information at a cost. We compare a treatment where only one sender communicates to a treatment where...