We estimate a Bayesian learning model with heterogeneity aimed at explaining expert forecast disagreement and its evolution over horizons. Disagreement is postulated to have three components due to differences in: i) the initial prior beliefs, ii) the weights attached on priors, and iii)...

We propose a statistical model to assess whether individuals strategically use mixed strategies in repeated games. We formulate a hidden Markov model in which the latent state space contains both pure and mixed strategies, and allows switching between these states. We apply the model to data...

This paper introduces a new game theoretic equilibrium, Bayesian equilibrium by iterative conjectures (BEIC). It requires agents to make predictions, starting from first order uninformative predictive distribution functions (or conjectures) and keep updating with statistical decision theoretic...

Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is not a subset of Nash equilibrium. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium requires players to have beliefs that are consistent with the equilibrium strategies of other players. Nash equilibrium does not explicitly specify the beliefs of the players. However, the default...

This paper uses Bayesian equilibrium by iterative conjectures approach to solve a noisy sequential game, that is, a sequential game with inaccurate observation clouded by noise. Bayesian equilibrium by iterative conjectures requires players to form conjectures about the strategies of the other...

This paper studies a new refinement for Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, Bayesian equilibrium by iterative conjectures (BEIC). BEIC requires players to make predictions, starting from first order uninformative predictive distribution functions (or conjectures) and keep updating with statistical...

This paper proposes a way to solve two sided incomplete information games which generally generates a unique equilibrium. Players in the games form conjectures about what other players want to do, starting from first order uninformative conjectures and keep updating with games theoretic and...

The investigation of response time and behavior has a long tradition in cognitive psychology, particularly for non-strategic decision-making. Recently, experimental economists have also studied response time in strategic interactions, but within an emphasis on either one-shot games or repeated...

Over a century ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes invited scholars to look at law through the lens of probability theory: ‘The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law'. But Holmes himself, and few others, have taken up this intriguing...

This paper develops a framework for estimating Quantal Response Equilibrium models from experimental data using Bayesian techniques. Bayesian techniques offer some advantages over the more commonly-used maximum likelihood approach: (i) the accuracy of the posterior simulation is limited by...