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Central Bank Communication and Trust : An Experimental Study on the European Central Bank and the General Public

Mochhoury, Sarah - 2023

While it has become clear that communication is a monetary policy tool for central banks, and extensive research has … been conducted on central bank communication with financial markets, little is known so far on central bank communication … European Central Bank (ECB) and on understanding of its communication about the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme, which …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014354162

Central bank reputation, cheap talk and transparency as substitutes for commitment : experimental evidence

Duffy, John; Heinemann, Frank - 2016 - This Draft: 2 December 2016

We implement a repeated version of the Barro-Gordon monetary policy game in the laboratory and ask whether reputation serves as a substitute for commitment, enabling the central bank to achieve the efficient Ramsey equilibrium and avoid the inefficient, time-inconsistent one-shot Nash...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011572114

Persuasion by dimension reduction

Malamud, Semyon; Schrimpf, Andreas - 2021 - This version: October 17, 2021

How should an agent (the sender) observing multi-dimensional data (the state vector) persuade another agent to take the desired action? We show that it is always optimal for the sender to perform a (non-linear) dimension reduction by projecting the state vector onto a lower-dimensional object...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012799529

Community mobilization around social dilemmas : evidence from lab experiments in rural MaliMaria Laura Alzua; Juan Camilo Cardenas and Habiba Djebbari

Alzua, Maria Laura; Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo; … - 2014

facilitating communication between village members and between leaders and the rest of the community. Is communication an effective … game. Communication between players increases contributions to the public good. Passing of information through a random …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010354549

Collusion, blackmail and whistle-blowing

Felli, Leonardo; Hortala-Vallve, Rafael - 2015

Whistle-blowing is usually regarded as a way to identify abuse and wrongdoing on the part of governments and corporations. In this paper we show how, at a micro level, whistle-blowing can be used as a designer tool to prevent opportunistic behavior, that takes the form of collusion or blackmail,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010518807

Using Cheap Talk to Polarize or Unify a Group of Decision Makers

Jeong, Daeyoung - 2019

We develop a model of strategic information transmission from an expert with informational superiority to decision makers who vote on a proposal. We show that an expert's simple cheap talk strategy can be surprisingly effective in persuading decision makers by polarizing or unifying their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012901595

Using Cheap Talk to Polarize or Unify a Group of Decision Makers

Jeong, Daeyoung - 2017

We develop a model of strategic information transmission from an outside expert with informational superiority to a group of people who make a decision by voting on a proposal. An outside expert who observes the qualities of a proposal sends a cheap talk message to decision makers with limited...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012953021

Directional Cheap Talk in Electoral Campaigns

Schnakenberg, Keith E. - 2015

, I develop and analyze a game-theoretic model of campaign communication in a two-candidate majority rule election with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014147381

Coalition Formation in International Monetary Policy Games

Kohler, Marion - 2015

It is well known from the analysis of monetary policy coordination of two countries that coordination often Pareto-dominates the outcome of the non-cooperative game. Hence both countries will have an incentive to form a union when it is certain that the other country will also join. However, in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014201313

Delegation and Loose Commitment

Nunes, Ricardo Cavaco - 2008

This paper analyzes and compares the performance of different delegation schemes when the central bank has imperfect commitment. A continuum of loose commitment possibilities is considered ranging from full commitment to full discretion. The results show that the performance of inflation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014212963