I study the effect of public information disclosure in a market setting where private information acquisition exhibits strategic complementarity. To overcome the issue of equilibrium multiplicity, I introduce heterogeneous information cost and imperfect information on the cost distribution. The...

We allow a strategic trader to choose when to acquire information about an asset's payoff, instead of endowing her with it. When the trader dynamically controls the precision of a flow of information, the optimal precision evolves stochastically and increases with market liquidity. However,...

We study a unique Chinese dataset of equity analysts' on-site visits to publicly listed companies. We find that analyst silence (no release of report from visit date to the next quarterly earnings announcement) contains information that negatively impacts both stock returns and earnings...

How do banks choose their debt maturity structure when credit markets are subject to information frictions? This paper proposes a model of equilibrium maturity choice with asymmetric information and endogenous roll-over risk. We show that in the presence of public signals about firms'...

Algorithmic trading strategies for execution often focus on the individual agent who is liquidating/acquiring shares. When generalized to multiple agents, the resulting stochastic game is notoriously difficult to solve in closed-form. Here, we circumvent the difficulties by investigating a...

In this short note, we show investors one way to calculate ideal investment sizing by using two rules of thumb based on a simple outline of individual risk aversion. We illustrate these two heuristics, which are not widely appreciated, with thought experiments involving coin flips and ketchup &...

We analyze how public disclosure of informed investors' trades results in manipulation, which in turn affects coordination and competition in a duopolistic setting. We show that disclosure always increases market efficiency but its effect on informed investors' profit is ambiguous. When informed...

This study examines two determinants of investor sentiment (ex-ante evaluation of future value-related events and ex-post reaction to event outcomes) using the data on soccer games and betting odds. Results suggest that the magnitude and the character of investor reactions vary considerably...

We study strategic disclosure timing by correlated firms in the presence of risk-averse investors. Firms delay disclosures in the hope that positively correlated firms will announce especially good news and lift their own price. Risk premia rise before disclosures, drop when disclosures occur,...

We study a strategic market game with finitely many traders, infinite horizon and real assets. To this standard framework (see, e.g. Giraud and Weyers, 2004) we add two key ingredients: First, default is allowed at equilibrium by means of some collateral requirement for financial assets; second,...