We introduce a general class of simplicity standards that vary the foresight abilities required of agents in extensive-form games. Rather than planning for the entire future of a game, agents are presumed to be able to plan only for those histories they view as simple from their current...

In Hawk-Dove games with mulitiplicity of equilibria, we study which equilibria are selected using various equilibrium selection methods. Using a uniform price auction as an illustrative example, we apply the tracing procedure method of Harsanyi and Selten (1988), the robustness to strategic...

The power exchange and the real-time markets used by the system operator differ in how system constraints are managed. This can result in regulatory arbitrage, which can increase consumer costs, increase the risk of power outages and distort investment incentives. This paper uses a...

We investigate the similarities and differences between matching markets and other canonical economic settings in the presence of complementarity. In particular, we explain the formal connections between the structure of matching markets with complementary contracts and games with strategic...

We introduce a general class of simplicity standards that vary the foresight abilities required of agents in extensive-form games. Rather than planning for the entire future of a game, agents are presumed to be able to plan only for those histories they view as simple from their current...

We study decentralized task coordination. Tasks are of varying complexity and agents asymmetric: agents capable of completing high-level tasks may also take on tasks originally contracted by lower-level agents, facilitating system-wide cost reductions. We suggest a family of decentralized...

The price mechanism is fundamental to economics but difficult to reconcile with incentive compatibility and individual rationality. We introduce a double clock auction for a homogeneous good market with multidimensional private information and multiunit traders that is deficit‐free, ex post...

We apply three equilibrium selection techniques to study which equilibrium is selected in a hawk-dove game with a multiplicity of equilibria. By using a uniform-price auction as an illustrative example, we find that when the demand in the auction is low or intermediate, the tracing procedure...

We consider matching-mechanism design in an environment in which agents acquire information about their preferences endogenously. Information is costly; thus, agents acquire information only if it is relevant to their decision-making. Agents' beliefs about their choice set (i.e., the set of...

In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller is willing to take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the...