This note analyzes in a fishery management problem the effects of relaxing one of the usual assumptions in the literature of dynamic games. Specifically, the assumption that players restrict to strategies that stabilize the system. Previous works in the literature have shown that feedback Nash...

In this paper, intraseasonal fishing is modeled as a differential game between fishermen in a total allowable catch-regulated fishery with and without individual fishing quotas (IFQs). Heterogeneous harvest values are included by incorporating time-specific harvest costs and a stock effect into...

Dams are essential for water storage and hydropower generation, but change river flow patterns and endanger local environments. Dam projects may further exacerbate already existing problems in trans-boundary rivers. We consider three scenarios of institutional factors: (1) each country pursues...

Dams are essential for water storage and hydropower generation, but change river flow patterns and endanger local environments. Dam projects may further exacerbate already existing problems in trans-boundary rivers. We consider three scenarios of institutional factors: (1) each country pursues...

We study the impact of uncertainty on the strategies and dynamics of symmetric non-cooperative games among players who exploit a non-excludable resource that reproduces under uncertainty. We focus on a particular class of games that deliver a Nash equilibrium in linear-symmetric strategies of...

In this paper, we investigate the optimal taxation policy in a differential oligopoly game where the competing firms share the access to a productive renewable resource. We show that, in a linear Feedback Nash Equilibrium of the game, a linear Markov tax, imposed on the output, and specified as...

Fisheries economics stand on the cusp of potentially sizeable changes in orientation and policy focus, leading in turn to comparable changes in modeling and general analysis. Notably, fisheries are increasingly framed as part of the overall marine environment rather than considered as solely or...

International agreements are necessary for exclusion of non-cooperative behavior. We parameterized an age-structured model for the North Sea herring fishery. The reference points of the current harvest control rule operationalize the precautionary approach. Applying the precautionary approach by...

In this paper the management of straddling fish stocks is approached through a coalition game in partition function form. A two-stage game is applied, assuming ex ante symmetric players and the classical Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model. It is shown that the game is characterized by positive...

From a game theoretical perspective, a prerequisite for an international fishery agreement (IFA) to be stable is that parties expect their benefits from joining the agreement to exceed the benefits from free riding on the agreement, and parties only comply with the agreement as long as this is...