Similar Search Results

Honesty in a signaling model of tax evasion

Pruzhansky, Vitaly - 2004

We study the phenomenon of tax evasion using a simple signaling model, in which the signal is taxpayer's reported income. The novelty of our approach lies in the way we define honesty. Specifically, we advocate the view that there are no absolutely honest taxpayers: all taxpayers may under...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334842

Is the severity of the penalty an effective deterrent? : a strategic approach for the crime of tax evasion

Chiarini, Bruno; Marzano, Elisabetta - 2016

In order to analyze the severity of sentencing, and to show how the probabilistic interpretation of strategic behavior can be tricky, this paper uses the crime strategic model (inspection game) proposed by Tsebelis. This model shows that any attempts to increase the severity of punishment will...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011544186

Discretionary Policy, Strategic Complementarity and Tax Evasion : A Strategic Analysis of the Italian Audit Mechanism

Chiarini, Bruno - 2010

Underlying this work is the idea that there is a problem of strategic complementarity of individuals who choose to evade, which results from the discretionary policies of governments and the strategic implications of the Studi di Settore (Sector Studies), the mechanism used in Italy to evaluate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013144633

Tax evasion under behavioral structures

Pantoja, Gabriela S.; Penaloza, Rodrigo Andrés de Souza - In: Economia : revista da ANPEC 15 (2014) 1, pp. 30-40

We study the strategic interactions between the fiscal authority and the taxpayer regarding tax evasion and auditing. We fit this interaction into a Bayesian game and introduce the concept of behavioral consistency, which helps reducing the number of available strategies and models the stylized...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865133

Towards a Three-Player Game Modelization of Corporate Tax Evasion

Neifar, Souhir - 2018

This paper models corporate tax evasion as a game among three players: tax authorities, shareholders and the manager in order to understand the behavior of corporate tax evasion (CTE), its causes and the possible mechanisms that can alleviate it. For this purpose, a three-level programming is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012913998

Lies in disguise : a theoretical analysis of cheating

Dufwenberg, Martin <Jr>; Dufwenberg, Martin - 2016

We perform a (psychological) game-theoretic analysis of cheating in the setting proposed by Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi (2013). The key assumption, which we refer to as perceived cheating aversion, is that the decision maker derives disutility in proportion to the amount in which he is perceived...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011566513

Bayesian Persuasion Mediating Cheap Talk

Sagiev, Erkin - 2020

We study a multi-player model of sequential communication. A receiver obtains information from two sources. The first is cheap talk with a sender, who acquires the information, while the second is Bayesian persuasion with a mediator, who modifies the initial information. We prove that Bayesian...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012822471

Lying to appear honest

Barron, Kai - 2019

This paper studies individual truth-telling behavior in the presence of multiple lying opportunities with heterogeneous stake sizes. The results show that individuals lie downwards (i.e. forgo money due to their lie) in low-stakes situations in order to signal honesty, and thereby mitigate the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012111150

Estimating Income in a Tax Compliance Game. A Bayesian Persuasion Approach

Hennigs, Raphaela - 2022

This paper studies the tax authority’s problem of how to estimate a tax payer’s income in a tax compliance game. The tax authority’s choice of how to estimate income is modelled using the Bayesian persuasion framework and assuming that income can be estimated arbitrarily precisely. I show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014242597

Confusion and reinforcement learning in experimental public goods games

Bayer, Ralph-C.; Renner, Elke; Sausgruber, Rupert - 2009

. The results show that reinforcement learning leads to dynamics similar to those observed in standard public goods games … explained by reinforcement learning. According to our estimates, learning only accounts for 41 percent of the decay in …, differ strongly from the learning dynamics, while a learning model estimated from the limited information treatment tracks …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343917

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last