Showing 1 - 10 of 36
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376532
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377258
preferences cannot explain these results. We then systematically vary the complexity of both components of Nash behaviour: (I) the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010233103
This paper presents an experiment that evaluates the effect of financial incentives and complexity in political science … voting experiments. To evaluate the effect of complexity we adopt a level-k reasoning model concept. This model by Nagel [1 … complexity promotes the highest degree of level-k strategic reasoning in every payment treatment. Standard financial incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010242048
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011549148
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011507619
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011554727
We use an agent-based model to investigate the interdependent dynamics between individual agency and emergent socioeconomic structure, leading to institutional change in a generic way. Our model simulates the emergence and exit of institutional units, understood as generic governed social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010417110
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010437174
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012819969