Similar Search Results

Kakhbod, Ali - 2013

This paper aims to study the impact of costly and private information acquisition in global games with applications in financial crisis (e.g. bank runs, currency crisis). While exogenous asymmetric information has been shown to select a unique equilibrium, we show that the endogenous costly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014165443

Voluntary Information Disclosure with Heterogeneous Beliefs

Liu, Xia - 2020

We present a model in which an insider (i.e., manager or CEO) and an informed outsider (i.e., analyst or professional) have heterogeneous beliefs on their shared information about a risky asset and analyze the insider's incentive to voluntarily disclose this information to the public. We find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012849406

Chapter 14. Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics : Accommodating Frictions in Coordination

Angeletos, G.-M.; Lian, C. - In: Handbook of macroeconomics : volume 2, v. 2A-2B SET, (pp. 1065-1240). 2016

This chapter studies how incomplete information helps accommodate frictions in coordination, leading to novel insights on the joint determination of expectations and macroeconomic outcomes. We review and synthesize recent work on global games, beauty contests, and their applications. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024269

Incomplete information in macroeconomics : accommodating frictions in coordination

Angeletos, Marios; Lian, Chen - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011573121

Crises and Prices : Information Aggregation, Multiplicity and Volatility

Angeletos, Marios; Werning, Iván - 2005

Many argue that crises - such as currency attacks, bank runs and riots - can be described as times of non-fundamental volatility. We argue that crises are also times when endogenous sources of information are closely monitored and thus an important part of the phenomena. We study the role of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014067957

Less Rationality, More Efficiency : A Laboratory Experiment on Lemons Markets

Kirstein, Roland; Kirstein, Annette - 2007

In this paper we experimentally test a theory of boundedly rational behavior in a lemons market. We analyzed two different market designs, for which perfect rationality implies complete and partial market collapse, respectively. Our empirical observations deviate substantially from these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014052590

Information Acquisition in Rumor-Based Bank Runs

He, Zhiguo - 2014

run. Uncertainty about the bank's liquidity and potential failure motivates depositors who hear the rumor to acquire … endogenous aggregate withdrawal speed and bank survival time. Private information acquisition about liquidity can subject solvent … indirectly crowding-out individual depositors' effort to acquire liquidity information …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013067484

Strategic Investment and Learning with Private Information

Klein, Nicolas Alexandre - 2019

We study a two-player game of strategic experimentation with private information in which agents choose the timing of risky investments. Agents learn about future returns through privately observed signals, others' investment decisions and from public experimentation outcomes when returns are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012896666

Intervention with Screening in Global Games

Shen, Lin - 2018

We analyze a canonical binary-action coordination game under the global games framework. To reduce coordination failure, we propose a novel intervention program that screens agents based on their heterogeneous interim beliefs. Compared with conventional government-guarantee type of programs, it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012925548

Selection-free predictions in global games with endogenous information and multiple equilibria

Angeletos, Marios; Pavan, Alessandro - 2012

Global games with endogenous information often exhibit multiple equilibria. In this paper we show how one can nevertheless identify useful predictions that are robust across all equilibria and that could not have been delivered in the common-knowledge counterparts of these games. Our analysis is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009790364