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Welfare stigma in the lab : evidence of social signaling
Friedrichsen, Jana; König, Tobias; Schmacker, Renke - 2017
can exclude other explanations for the observed stigma effect. In the experiment, social stigmatization implies a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011663605
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Welfare stigma in the lab : evidence of social signaling
Friedrichsen, Jana; König, Tobias; Schmacker, Renke - 2016
transfer by 30 percentage points. We build a theoretical model that interprets welfare stigma as unfavorable inferences about … to live off others. Contrary to conventional wisdom, stigma may thus also contribute to low take-up if eligibility is not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011574103
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Welfare Stigma in the Lab : Evidence of Social Signaling
Friedrichsen, Jana - 2017
can exclude other explanations for the observed stigma effect. In the experiment, social stigmatization implies a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012952402
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Can contracts signal social norms? : experimental evidence
Danilov, Anastasia; Sliwka, Dirk - 2013
We investigate whether incentive schemes signal social norms and thus affect behavior beyond their direct economic consequences. A principal-agent experiment is studied in which prior to contract choice principals are informed about past actions of other agents and thus have more information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009765609
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Can Contracts Signal Social Norms? Experimental Evidence
Danilov, Anasatsia - 2013
We investigate whether incentive schemes signal social norms and thus affect behavior beyond their direct economic consequences. A principal-agent experiment is studied in which prior to contract choice principals are informed about past actions of other agents and thus have more information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013079162
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Laws and norms with (un)observable actions
Fluet, Claude; Mungan, Murat C. - 2020
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012298734
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Until taxes do us part : tax penalties or bonuses and the marriage decision
Barigozzi, Francesca; Cremer, Helmuth; Roeder, Kerstin - 2017
up. In this signaling game, proposing (or getting married) is costly but can indicate strong love. The striking property … sufficiently large, the signaling mechanism breaks down, and only a pooling equilibrium in which fewer couples get married remains …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011752304
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Until taxes do us part : tax penalties or bonuses and the marriage decision
Barigozzi, Francesca; Cremer, Helmuth; Roeder, Kerstin - 2017
up. In this signaling game, proposing (or getting married) is costly but can indicate strong love. The striking property … sufficiently large, the signaling mechanism breaks down, and only a pooling equilibrium in which fewer couples get married remains …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011758225
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Until taxes do us part : tax penalties or bonuses and the marriage decision
Barigozzi, Francesca; Cremer, Helmuth; Roeder, Kerstin - 2017
up. In this signaling game, proposing (or getting married) is costly but can indicate strong love. The striking property … sufficiently large, the signaling mechanism breaks down, and only a pooling equilibrium in which fewer couples get married remains …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011819323
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Persuasive silence
Suzuki, Toru - 2012
. -- Signaling game ; Consideration set ; Counter signaling ; Limited attention ; Marketing ; Advertising …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009516790