We provide an explanation for why committees may behave over-cautiously. A committee of experts makes a decision on a proposed innovation on behalf of 'society'. Each expert's signal about the innovation's quality is generated by the available evidence and the best practices of the experts'...

In this paper, we consider a committee of experts that decides whether to approve or reject a proposed innovation on behalf of society. In addition to a payoff linked to the adequateness of the committee’s decision, each expert receives a disesteem payoff if he/she voted in favor of an...

In this paper, we provide an explanation for why committees may behave over-cautiously. A committee of experts must decide whether to approve or reject a proposed innovation on behalf of "society." Each expert's private signal is a noisy version of what the "state of the art science" would...

In this paper, we consider a committee of experts that decides whether to approve or reject a proposed innovation on behalf of society. In addition to a payoff linked to the adequateness of the committee's decision, each expert receives a disesteem payoff if he/she voted in favor of an ill-fated...

It has long been established in the literature that the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria of any binary game of strategic complements among a set N of players can be seen as a lattice on the set of all subsets of N under the partial order defined by the set inclusion relation (⊆). If the...

Multiple candidates (senders) compete over an exogenous number of jobs. There are different tasks in which the candidates' unobservable ability determines their probability of success. We study a signaling game with multiple senders each choosing one task to perform, and one receiver who...