In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...

Financial markets and macroeconomic environments are often characterized by positive externalities. In these environments, transparency may reduce expected welfare from an ex-ante point of view: public announcements serve as a focal point for higher-order beliefs and affect agents' behaviour...

We consider an in nitely repeated reappointment game in a principal- agent relationship. Typical examples are voter-politician or government- public servant relationships. The agent chooses costly effort and enjoys being in office until he is deselected. The principal observes a noisy signal of...

Biased responses in survey studies could seriously harm and mislead our economic decision-making. To mitigate survey response bias, we suggest an alternative way of combining two existing strategies, cheap talk and the Bayesian Truth Serum (BTS). In our three proof-of-concept experiments, we...

Traditional unobserved component models assume that the trend, cycle and seasonal components of an individual time series evolve separately over time. Although this assumption has been relaxed in recent papers that focus on trend-cycle interactions, it remains at the core of all seasonal...