. The contract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal. We find …

. The con- tract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal. We find … productivity and players utility in equilibrium. -- altruism ; spite ; incentives ; relational contracts ; efficiency wages …

reduce the effort costs of a worker, and analyze the optimal combination of motivational effort and monetary incentives. We … distinguish two cases. First, the firm owner chooses the intensity of motivation and bears the motivational costs. Second, another … conditions under which monetary incentives and motivational effort are substitutes or complements, and show that motivational …

reduce the effort costs of a worker, and analyze the optimal combination of motivational effort and monetary incentives. We … distinguish two cases. First, the firm owner chooses the intensity of motivation and bears the motivational costs. Second, another … conditions under which monetary incentives and motivational effort are substitutes or complements, and show that motivational …

can hold-up, the lower is the implementable degree of peer dependent incentives. In a setting with team effects … complementary tasks and peer pressure, respectively we show that while team-based incentives are optimal if agents are dispensable …, it may be costly, and in fact suboptimal, to provide team incentives once the agents become indispensable …

It is difficult to test the prediction that future career prospects create implicit effort incentives because …

It is difficult to test the prediction that future career prospects create implicit effort incentives because …