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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001235527
This paper presents DSGE Nash, a toolkit to solve for pure strategy Nash equilibria of global games in general equilibrium macroeconomic models. Although primarily designed to solve for Nash equilibria in DSGE models, the toolkit encompasses a broad range of options including solutions up to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014076795
This paper presents DSGE Nash, a toolkit to solve for pure strategy Nash equilibria of global games in macro models. Although primarily designed to solve for Nash equilibria in DSGE models, the toolkit encompasses a broad range of options including solutions up to the third order, multiple...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013277145
may or may not coordinate on the rational equilibrium outcome. A general finding is that under positive expectations … feedback (strategic complementarity) - where optimistic (pessimistic) expectations can cause a boom (bust) - coordination … by coordination on trend-following behavior leading to (almost-)self-fulfilling equilibria. Heterogeneous expectations …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011929804
We relax the common assumption of homogeneous beliefs in principal-agent relationships with adverse selection. Principals are competitors in the product market and write contracts also on the base of an expected aggregate. The model is a version of a cobweb model. In an evolutionary learning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012607986
flexibility and credibility. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011572114
more precise when the policymaker's beliefs conform with prior public expectations, whereas it is more vague in the case of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012181571
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Tuning one's shower in some hotels may turn into a challenging coordination game with imperfect information. The temperature sensitivity increases with the number of agents, making the problem possibly unlearnable. Because there is in practice a finite number of possible tap positions, identical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003612880