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This paper studies individual truth-telling behavior in the presence of multiple lying opportunities with heterogeneous stake sizes. The results show that individuals lie downwards (i.e. forgo money due to their lie) in low-stakes situations in order to signal honesty, and thereby mitigate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012111150
Reputation concerns in credit markets restrain borrowers' temptations to take excessive risk. The strength of these …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011685308
We develop the real option signaling games models of equity financing of a risky project under asymmetric information, where the firm quality is known to the firm management but not outside investors. Unlike the usual assumption of perpetuity of investment, we assume that the time window of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012917737
We study the role of information about the multiplier in a finitely repeated investment game. A high multiplier increases the reputational incentives of a trustee, leading to more repayments. Our perfect Bayesian equilibrium analysis shows that if the trustee is privately informed about the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012422494
of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome …. Further, any report hurts the forecaster’s reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties. The … reputation of a silent forecaster, on the other hand, gradually improves over time. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012123351
We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011504350
We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011506852
Previous work shows that reputation results may fail in repeated games between two long-run players with equal discount … reputation result. If player 1 is a particular commitment type with positive probability and player 2's actions are imperfectly … agents become patient. -- Repeated Games ; Reputation ; Equal Discount Factor ; Long-run Players ; Imperfect Observation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008665869
We study the effects of preselection on an expert's incentive to give truthful advice in a decision environment in which certain decisions yield more precise estimates about the expert's expertise. The introduction of a preselection stage, in which the decision maker can study the case before...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011302441
analysts want investors to trust their reports in the future, both will aim to build a reputation for being aligned. In …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013019964