We provide theoretical conjectures about and experimental evidence on the emergence of redistributive societies. Individuals first vote on a distribution rule with their feet and then invest and redistribute total income according to the chosen rule. We vary the individuals’ information about...

We provide experimental evidence on the emergence of redistributive societies. Individuals first vote on redistribution by feet and then learn their productivity and invest. We vary the individuals' information about their productivities at the time when they choose a distribution rule and find...

The present paper develops a new institutional perspective of intellectual property right (IPR) enforcement dilemmas in developing countries, focusing on the case of software protection in Egypt. Transplanting western made IPR rules and enforcement strategies to developing countries without any...

We study information conditions under which individuals are willing to delegate their sanctioning power to a central authority. We design a public goods game in which players can move between institutional environments, and we vary the observability of others' contributions. We find that the...

Recent experimental studies question whether societies can selfgovern social dilemmas with the help of decentralized punishment opportunities. One important challenge for the mechanism is imperfect information about cooperative behavior. It has been shown that imperfect information increases...