Consider an environment where long-lived experts repeatedly interact with short-lived customers. In periods when an … appropriate. We find that there exists an equilibrium in which experts always play truthfully and choose the customer's preferred … with high probability if the previous treatment was minor, and low probability if it was major. If experts have private …

Consider an environment where long-lived experts repeatedly interact with short-lived customers. In periods when an … appropriate. We find that there exists an equilibrium in which experts always play truthfully and choose the customer's preferred …If experts have private information regarding their own payoffs as well as what treatments are appropriate, then there …

A decision-maker solicits information from two partially informed experts and then makes a choice under uncertainty …. The experts can be either moderately or extremely biased relative to the decision-maker, which is their private … information. I investigate the incentives of the experts to share their private information with the decision-maker and analyze …