More precise public disclosure reduces uncertainty about economic fundamentals, but it can increase uncertainty about other agents' actions, leading to coordination failure. We conducted a laboratory experiment to study the effects of public information precision and strategic complementarity on...

More precise public disclosure reduces uncertainty about economic fundamentals, but it can increase uncertainty about other agents' actions, leading to coordination failure. We conducted a laboratory experiment to study the effects of public information precision and strategic complementarity on...

In common-interest spatial-dispersion games the agents' common goal is to choose distinct locations. We experimentally investigate the role of cognition in such games and compare it with the role of cognition in spatial matching games. In our setup cognition matters because agents may be...

We experimentally investigate coordination games in which cognition plays an important role, i.e., where outcomes are affected by the agents level of understanding of the game and the beliefs they form about each others' understanding. We ask whether and when repeated exposure permits agents to...