The goal of this paper is to establish the general framework of consensus equilibria for Mining-Pool Games in Blockchain Ecosystems, and in particular to explain the stable in the sense for the existence of consensus equilibria related to mining gap game's behaviors by using one new concept...

An important goal of financial risk regulation is promoting coordination. Law's coordinating function minimizes costly conflict and encourages greater uniformity among market participants. Likewise, privately developed market standards, such as standard-form contracts and rules incorporated into...

Large, international banking groups have sought to centralise their cross-currency liquidity management: liquidity shortages in one currency are financed using liquidity surpluses in another currency. The nature of risks to financial stability emerging from global liquidity management depends on...

Incomplete information is an obstacle to deal-making. Information problems also exist as to ongoing matters in the parties’ relationship. That this is so is well known. But attention has focused largely on a subset of information problems where there is agreement on what the information is and...

In this paper we investigate when public enforcement of insider trading regulations reduces the amount of insider trading. We model a game between a potentially self-interested regulator enforcing insider trading laws and a trader who may be trading on inside information. We show that...

In the context of the GATS negotiations, this paper emphasizes the key roles that services play domestically in terms of accounting for rising shares of domestic output and employment as well as cross-border trade. There is substantial evidence indicating that services liberalization and...

Large literatures in operations and economics analyze dynamic models of profit-optimizing firms. The insights and algorithms in these literatures can be adapted to maximize value if the model excludes external strategic interactions and risk of bankruptcy. The insertion of external strategic...

We study how framing interplays with information design. Whereas Sender conceives all contingencies separately, Receiver cannot initially distinguish among some of them, i.e., has a coarse frame. To influence Receiver’s behavior, Sender first decides whether to refine Receiver’s frame and...

We present a model in which an insider (i.e., manager or CEO) and an informed outsider (i.e., analyst or professional) have heterogeneous beliefs on their shared information about a risky asset and analyze the insider's incentive to voluntarily disclose this information to the public. We find...

We analyze a canonical binary-action coordination game under the global games framework. To reduce coordination failure, we propose a novel intervention program that screens agents based on their heterogeneous interim beliefs. Compared with conventional government-guarantee type of programs, it...