In this study, we investigate how and why people discriminate among different groups, including their own groups and multiple out-groups. In a laboratory experiment, we use dictator games for five groups to compare actual transfers to in-group and out-group agents with the respective beliefs...

We explain contributions in public goods games with the help of the reciprocity model of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) by applying some plausible modifications: Most importantly, we assume that subjects overestimate the kindness of their group members. In combination with the finding that...

This paper proposes Thompson Sampling as a unifying and tractable theory of expectation formation, which is in line with theories of the brain. Thompson Sampling means that in uncertain environments, agents update their beliefs in a Bayesian way, and subsequently make a random draw from the...

In experimental games, a substantial minority of players often fail to best respond. Using two-person 3x3 one-shot games, we investigated whether 'structuring' the pre-decision deliberation process produces greater consistency between individuals' stated values and beliefs on the one hand and...

In experimental games, a substantial minority of players often fail to best respond. Using two-person 3x3 one-shot games, we investigate whether ‘structuring' the pre-decision deliberation process produces greater consistency between individuals' stated values and beliefs on the one hand and...

In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...

We study two person-betting games with inconsistent commonly know beliefs, using an experimental approach. In our experimental games, participants bet against one another, each bettor choosing one of two possible outcomes, and payoff odds are know at the time bets are placed. Bettors’ beliefs...

We study how subjects in an experiment use different forms of public information about their opponents' past behavior. In the absence of public information, subjects appear to use rather detailed statistics summarizing their private experiences. If they have additional public information, they...

More precise public disclosure reduces uncertainty about economic fundamentals, but it can increase uncertainty about other agents' actions, leading to coordination failure. We conducted a laboratory experiment to study the effects of public information precision and strategic complementarity on...

More precise public disclosure reduces uncertainty about economic fundamentals, but it can increase uncertainty about other agents' actions, leading to coordination failure. We conducted a laboratory experiment to study the effects of public information precision and strategic complementarity on...