I study the effects of improved public information on equilibrium welfare and price dispersion, providing sufficient conditions for negative and positive effects. Public information affects welfare by reducing excessive (though rational) pessimism induced by sequential learning. Reduced...

We show that a rational expectations equilibrium need not be incentive compatible, need not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and may not be fully Pareto optimal, unless the utility functions are state independent. A comparison of rational expectations equilibria with core...

We extend the analysis of van Damme (1987, Section 7.5) of the famous smoothing demand in Nash (1953) as an argument for the singular stability of the symmetric Nash bargaining solution among all Pareto efficient equilibria of the Nash demand game. Van Damme's analysis provides a clean...

This paper introduces an extension of the vehicle routing problem by including several distributors in competition. Each customer is characterized by demand and a wholesale price. Under this scenario a solution may have unserviced customers and elementary routes with no customer visits. The...

We consider two-player turn-based game arenas for which we investigate uniformity properties of strategies. These properties involve sets of plays in order to express useful constraints on strategies that are not μ-calculus definable. Typically, we can represent constraints on allowed...

We consider a game-theoretic model of counterproliferation, in which a single Incumbent (holding nuclear weapons) is faced with a sequence of potential Entrants (who are considering developing and deploying a nuclear capability or other weapons of mass destruction of their own). The Incumbent...

In this paper, we try to analyze the interactions among the shippers and the carriers, including the rail and marine shipping industry, in the bulk shipping market. Our paper presents both a two-player game model, and a two-stage, three-player, game model that includes the buyer as an active...

A manufacturer and a retailer are the members of a simple distribution channel for a particular product in a segmented market. The advertising efforts of the two agents have a joint effect on the goodwill of the different market segments and then on the demand. The channel members aim at...

This paper considers a large population, game theoretic job-search problem, in which the ratio of job searchers to jobs is α. There are n distinct types of jobs, each with an associated value. Each searcher can only accept one job and cannot recall a job previously rejected. Once a searcher...