A game in which an incumbent and an entrant decide the timings of entries into a new market is investigated. The profit flows involve two uncertain factors: (1) the basic level of the demand of the market observed only by the incumbent and (2) the fluctuation of the profit flow described by a...

We explain essentially all known discounted utility anomalies as artefacts of the optimizing behavior of an individual with a time-separable utility function, who perceives a good as a source of a stochastic consumption stream, and believes that she can wait for an optimal moment to buy or sell...

Using the real options game approach, we analyze the two-stage preemptive patent-investment race between an incumbent and a challenger (new entrant) in a product market with profit flow uncertainty. The challenger can gain entry into the monopolized product market dominated by the incumbent by...

We analyse the entry decisions of competing firms in a two-player stochastic real option game, when rivals can exert different but correlated uncertain profitabilities from operating. In the presence of entry costs, decision thresholds exhibit hysteresis, the range of which is decreasing in the...

This paper discusses a selected literature on continuous-time option games models, providing new insights and extensions. The paper analyzes both symmetrical and asymmetrical duopoly under uncertainty, including issues like preemption, non-binding collusion, perfect-Nash equilibriums,...

We study risk-shifting behavior in a laboratory experiment, a setup that overcomes methodological hurdles faced by empiricists in the past. The participants are high-level managers. We observe risk shifting in a simple setup, but less in a setup with a continuation value. Reputation effects also...

Most applications of real options analysis assume a single decision-maker uses flexibility to maximize a firm's market value. This paper presents an alternative approach suitable for firms with two utility-maximizing decision-makers who have joint responsibility for setting firm policies. In...

The purpose of this study is to examine and demonstrate the strategic investment decisions faced by Taiwan's chain and franchise store enterprise. We show that incorporating an abandonment option to strategic timing in a game-theoretic real option approach makes the approach more complete and...

This monograph presents existing and new research on three approaches to multiagent incentives: simpler mechanisms, robust mechanisms, and implicit contracts. The goal of all three approaches is to find theories that better explain observed institutions than the standard approach has