A common feature of many speculative attack models on currencies is the existence of multiple equilibrium solutions. When choosing the equilibrium strategy a trader faces Knightian uncertainty about the rational choice of the other traders. We show that the concept of Choquet expected utility...

In this short note, we show investors one way to calculate ideal investment sizing by using two rules of thumb based on a simple outline of individual risk aversion. We illustrate these two heuristics, which are not widely appreciated, with thought experiments involving coin flips and ketchup &...

This paper attempts to form a model which can help explain the evolving regulatory regime around insider trading. We develop a simple sequential game-theoretical model of insider trading transactions and, utilizing Monte Carlo simulation to determine equilibrium, we show that costly...

DeBondt and Thahler (1995) point out that while von Neumann-Morgenstern (1947) utility functions, the axioms of cardinal utility (Copeland and Weston, 1992), risk aversion, rational expectations, etc., have formed the basis for theories of choice under uncertainty, research in behavioral...

We propose an extension of the class of rational expectations bubbles (REBs) to the more general rational beliefs setting of Kurz (1994a,b). In a potentially non-stationary but stationarizable environment, it is possible to hold more than one (small-r) “rational” expectation. When rational...

A quantum financial approach to finite games of strategy is addressed, with an extension of Nash's theorem to the quantum financial setting, allowing for an entanglement of games of strategy with two-period financial allocation problems that are expressed in terms of: the consumption plans'...

We model organizational decision making as costless pre-play communication. Decision making is called authoritarian if only one player is allowed to speak and consensual if all players are allowed to speak. Players are assumed to have limited cognitive capacity and we characterize their behavior...

The discussion about employee representation on supervisory boards has received much attention from scholars and politicians around the world. We provide new insights to this ongoing debate by employing power indices from game theory to examine the "real" power of employees on boards and its...

This paper studies a monopolist firm selling a fixed capacity. The firm sets a price before demand uncertainty is resolved. Speculators may enter the market purely with the intention of resale, which can be profitable if demand turns out to be high. Consumers may strategically choose when to...

The impact of information technology (IT) on the stability of market equilibrium is explained from a simple microeconomic standpoint. Attributes of a dynamically stable “virtual” market equilibrium are described assuming consumer rationality, an elastic supply curve, and minimum static...