Showing 1 - 10 of 2,715
This paper examines a class of signaling games with multi-dimensional private information to study how the prior, joint distribution of the private information variables affect a signal's effectiveness in revealing information about these variables. To illustrate the general problem investigated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014124095
We study a strategic market game with finitely many traders, infinite horizon and real assets. To this standard framework (see, e.g. Giraud and Weyers, 2004) we add two key ingredients: First, default is allowed at equilibrium by means of some collateral requirement for financial assets; second,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013108835
We are constructing an imperfect competition general equilibrium model, with non-consumable money and labor market; our toolkit is an equilibrium default model of Shubik-Wilson (1978). Our result has an ‘equilibrium volatility' simultaneously occurring at all three markets: labor, goods, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012895423
This paper reports on experiments regarding cheap talk games where senders attempt deception when their interests are not in conflict with those of the receiver. The amount of miscommunication is higher than in previous experimental findings on cheap talk games in situations where senders’ and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013250032
This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap talk information. We find that the poor quality of the information transmitted leads to a collapse of information markets. The reasons for this are surprising given the previous experimental results on cheap-talk games....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011822038
This paper reports on experiments regarding cheap talk games where senders attempt deception when their interests are not in conflict with those of the receiver. The amount of miscommunication is higher than in previous experimental findings on cheap talk games in situations where senders’ and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012418635
Extensive evidence suggests that managers strategically choose the complexity of their descriptive disclosures. However, their motives in doing so appear mixed, as complex disclosures are used to obfuscate in some cases and as a means of informative communication in others. Building on these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013210882
This paper studies information acquisition and use in network games. The network structure incorporates both strategic complements (positive links) and substitutes (negative links). An information-use game played on a correlation-adjusted network is derived. Equilibrium inefficiencies in both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854885
This monograph presents existing and new research on three approaches to multiagent incentives: simpler mechanisms, robust mechanisms, and implicit contracts. The goal of all three approaches is to find theories that better explain observed institutions than the standard approach has
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013064724
We study the strategic disclosure of demand information and product-market strategies of duopolists. In a setting where both firms receive information with some probability, we show that firms selectively disclose information in equilibrium in order to influence their competitorś product-market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301237