This paper studies the incentive compatibility of solutions to generalized indivisible good allocation problems introduced by S¨onmez (1999), which contain the well-known marriage problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962) and the housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) as special cases. In...

This paper studies the incentive compatibility of solutions to generalized indivisible good allocation problems introduced by Sonmez (1999), which contain the well-known marriage problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962) and the housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) as special cases. In particular,...

We show that the characterization result of the weak core correspondence in simple games in Takamiya et al. (2018) still holds true even when the set of alternatives contains uncountably infinite elements

We provide a new proof of the non-emptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their "balanced cover games", which are non-empty, can be...

Top responsiveness is introduced by Alcalde and Revilla [Journal of Mathematical Economics 40 (2004) 869-887] as a property which induces a rich domain on players's preferences in hedonic games, and guarantees the existence of core stable partitions. We strengthen this observation by proving the...

A new feature pertaining to proposer's ability to implement offers is introduced in the extensive form bargaining mechanism studied in Chatterjee et. al. (1993). This mechanism is used to analyze two classes of coalitional games with transferable utility. One class is that of strictly...

Yu and Zhang (2020) propose a job rotation model to study rotation schemes thatwidely exist in real life. In the model agents' rights to consume own endowmentsare restricted, but their rights to trade endowments are unrestricted. This poses aninteresting contrast with the housing market model of...

We study the possibility of designing satisfactory ex post incentive compatible single valued direct mechanisms in interdependent values environments, characterized by the set of agents type profiles and by their induced preference profiles. For environments that we call knit and strict, only...

We show that there is no consistent Pareto improvement over any stable mechanism. To overcome this impossibility, we introduce the following weak consistency requirement: Whenever a set of students, each of whom is assigned to a school that is under-demanded at the student-optimal stable...

The application of game theory and cognitive economy to analyze the problem of undesired location - The analysts of the processes of public bodies decision - taking have long been discussing on the establishment of proper strategies to manage "environmental conflicts" - above all the so-called...